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I. STATEl\lIENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.
This case arises out of a $20,000.00 motor vehicle dealer bond t issued by CNA Surety, d/b/a

Western Surety Company ("Western Surety") to Best of the Best Auto Sales, Inc. ("Best of the
Best"). 2
In 2008, Best of the Best purchased vehicles from Dealers Auto Auction ofidaho ("Dealers")
and Brasher's Idaho Auto Auction ("Brasher's"). Best of the Best then sold those vehicles to
consumers without paying the auto auctions for the vehicles or providing titles to the consumers, as
required by I.C. § 49-502(1). These consumers, through Dealers and Brasher's, submitted claims
to Western Surety that exceeded the $20,000.00 bond limit. Upon inquiry, Best of the Best offered
no defense for failing to give the consumers their titles. Western Surety paid the Brasher's and
Dealers claims on March 11, 2009, and June 12, 2009, respectively, for undisputed violations of I.C.
§§ 49-1608(1) and 49-1610(1). Western Surety paid the claims in good faith, as required by J.C.
§ 41-1839(3).

When Respondent Nick Hestead ("Hestead") made his claim on August 31, 2009, Western
Surety had already exhausted the bond on the Dealers and Brasher's claims.
The district court found that J.C.§ 49-1610 provides that a surety can only pay bond claims
based on a judgment. Without analyzing whether Western Surety may be held liable above the

1

Idaho Code§ 49-1608 requires a motor vehicle dealer to obtain a license bond.

2

It should be noted that "Best of the Best Auto Sales" was registered as an assumed business name for Ron
Zechmann in 2001. The principal on the bond is "Best of the Best Auto Sales, Inc."
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statutory penal amount of the bond, or analyzing the language ofl.C. § 41-1839(3), the court entered
judgment for Hestead.
Western Surety requests that this Court reverse the district court's grant of summary
judgment because it complied with LC.§§ 49-1610 and 41-1839 when it paid the seven claims on
behalf of a principal that was out of business and never disputed the claims. The trial court found
Western Surety made these payments in good faith, which is all that I.C. § 41-1839(3) requires a
surety do when it pays a claim. Accordingly, Hestead has no claim and the district court erred in
granting Hestead summary judgment.
B.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Best of the Best obtained a motor vehicle dealer bond from Western Surety in
2004, as required by J.C.§ 49-1608.

Best of the Best incorporated with the Idaho Secretary of State on November 12, 2004. (Aff.
of Joshua S. Evett in Supp. ofDef.'s Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. ("EvettAff."), Ex. B, R. Vol.
I, p. 94.) Both Morgan Ririe and Ron Zechmann were listed as incorporators. (Id.) On November
19, 2004, David M. Ririe (a.k.a. Morgan Ririe) obtained a $20,000.00 "VehicleNessel Dealer Bond"
#69815964 from Western Surety. (Aff. of Thomas J. Snyder in Supp. of Def.'s Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot.
for Summ. J. ("Snyder Aff."), Ex. A, R. Vol. IL p. 123.) A December 15, 2004, rider to the bond
changed the principal 's name to "Best of the Best Automsales Isic], Inc." (Snyder Aff., Ex. A-1, R.
Vol. II, p. 126.) The bond provided that Western Surety and the principal were 'jointly and severally
held and firmly bound unto the state of Idaho to indemnify persons, firms, or corporations for loss
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suffered by reason of violation of the conditions hereinafter contained." (Snyder Aff., Ex. A, R. Vol.
II, p. 123.)
The conditions of the bond include:
The Principal shall not practice any fraud, make any fraudulent
representation or violate any of the provisions of Chapter 16 Title 49
Idaho Code or rules and regulations promulgated by the Idaho
Transportation Department; or the provisions of Chapters 2, 4 and 5
Title 49 Idaho Code; Idaho Code 49-1418; Chapter 6 Title 48 Idaho
Code; or federal motor vehicle safety standards or odometer fraud
during the time said Principal is licensed as a dealer. 3

The aggregate liability of the Surety shall be limited to the amount of
this bond, regardless of the number of years this bond shall remain in
effect and regardless of the number and amount of claims made
thereon.

(Id.)
. Western Surety canceled the bond on October 20, 2008, pursuant to Best of the Best's
request. (Snyder Aff., Ex. B, R. Vol. II, p. 127; Snyder Aff., Ex. B-1, R. Vol. II, p. 128.) Best of the
Best was dissolved with the Idaho Secretary of State on February 5, 2009. (Evett Aff., Ex. B, R. Vol.
I, p. 95.)

2.

Western Surety paid the consumer claims presented by Dealers and Brasher's
in good faith, and exhausted the bond, before Hestead submitted his claim.

On September 19, 2008, and November 13, 2008, Dealers and Brasher's submitted claims
to Western Surety on behalf of seven consumers. (Snyder Aff., Ex. C, R. Vol. II, pp. 129-32; Snyder

3

These statutes govern a variety of prohibited actions including, but not limited to, fraud. The bond
language represents the requirements set forth by LC. §§ 49-1608(1) and 49-1610(1).
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Aff., Ex. F, R. Vol. II, pp. 139-43.) On October 16, 2008, and January 9, 2009, Western Surety
requested by letter that Best of the Best provide it with any defenses that it had to the claims made
by Dealers and Brasher' s. (Snyder Aff., Ex. E, R. Vol. II. p. 138; Snyder Aff., Ex. H, R. Vol. II, p.
146.)
Best of the Best did not respond to Western Surety's inquiries. After evaluating the claims,
and determining they were valid, Western Surety paid $9,360.00 to Brasher's on March 11, 2009,
and $10,640.00 to Dealers on June 12, 2009, forrelease of the titles to the consumers. (Snyder Aff.•
Ex. K, R. Vol. II, pp. 152-53; Snyder Aff., Ex. N, R. Vol. II, pp. 158-59.) Those payments exhausted
the $20,000.00 bond, ending Western Surety's liability.
Western Surety informed the Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD") of the settlements
and exhaustion of the bond on July 23, 2009. (Snyder Aff.• Ex. 0, R. Vol. II, p. 160.) This letter
also reminded ITD that Notice of Cancellation of the bond was sent to ITD on October 20, 2008.
(Id.)

a.

Best of the Best sold seven vehicles to consumers without having paid the
auto auctions and did not provide the consumers with certificates of title to
the vehicles.

Best of the Best purchased seven vehicles from Dealers in June 2008. (Snyder Aff., Ex. C,

R. Vol. II, p. 130.) Best of the Best then sold four of those vehicles to consumers: a 1995 GMC to
Juan and Selena Mata, a 1995 Toyota to Walter Spitz, a 1999 Pontiac to James Gunoe, and a 2002
Ford to Kimberly Rich. (Snyder Aff.• Ex. M, R. Vol. II, pp. 155-57; Snyder Aff., Ex. N, R. Vol. II,
p. 158.) However, Best of the Best did not receive the certificates of title from Dealers because Best
of the Best issued a check to Dealers on insufficient funds in the amount of $8,810.00. (Snyder Aff.,
-4-

Ex. C, R. Vol. II, p. 131.) Therefore, Best of the Best did not provide the consumers with the titles
to their purchased vehicles, (Snyder Aff., Ex. M, R. Vol. Il, pp. 155-57), as reql).ired by I.C. § 49502(1).
Similarly, Best of the Best purchased three vehicles from Brasher's in April 2008, and then
sold the three vehicles to consumers: a 1998 Ford to Brian Shaw and Trista Jacobsen, a 1997 Honda
to Shawn and Pepper Yanzuk, and a 1991 Dodge to Jason and Alison Stucki. (Snyder Aff., Ex. F,
R. Vol. II, pp. 139-43; Snyder Aff., Ex. J-1, R. Vol. II, pp. 149-51; Snyder Aff., Ex. K, R. Vol. II,

p. 152.) Best of the Best did not receive the certificates of title from Brasher's because Best of the
Best issued a check to Brasher's on insufficient funds in the amount of $9,360.00. (Snyder Aff., Ex.
F,R. Vol.11,p. 140.) Brian Shaw wrote to WestemSuretyonJanuary26, 2009, explaining that after
purchasing his 1998 Ford Ranger from Best of the Best on May 10, 2008, he contacted Ron
Zechmann on numerous occasions in an attempt to obtain title to the vehicle. (Snyder Aff., Ex. J,
R. Vol. II, p. 148.) However, Zechmannjust provided Shaw with "a new story" each time and title

was never provided. (Id.) Best of the Best also did not give the Yanzuks and Stuckis titles to their
purchased vehicles. (Snyder Aff., Ex. K, R. Vol. Il, p. 152.)
Idaho Code§ 49-502(1) requires vehicle dealers to provide certificates of title to consumers
upon sale. I.C. § 49-502( 1). (See also Evett Aff., Deposition of Daryl Marler ("Marler Dep."),4 p.
14, l. 18 - p. 15, 1. 15, R. Vol. I, p. 77 (Mr. Marler testified that title must be provided within 30 days
of purchase).) Resolving claims based on failure to provide title is important to Western Surety

4

Mr. Marler is the Dealer Operations Program Supervisor at ITD, and a long-time employee in that
department. (Evett Aff., Marler Dep., p. 4, l. 13 - p. 5, l. 17, R. Vol. I, p. 75.)
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because, without a certificate of title, a consumer often has difficulties obtaining insurance,
registering a vehicle, or satisfying a lender's lien requirements. (Snyder Aff., <J[ 6.f, R. Vol. II, p. 117;
Evett Aff., Marler Dep., p. 15, 11. 9-20, R. Vol. I, p. 77.) Situations in which consumers do not
receive titles to their vehicles is an area of "major concern" to ITD due to the potential ramifications
for consumers, particularly with lien issues. (Evett Aff., Marler Dep., p. 44, 1. 1 - p. 45, 1. 5, R. Vol.
I, p. 85; EvettAff., MarlerDep., p. 15, 1. 9- p. 16, l. 25, R. Vol. I, pp. 77-78.)
b.

Dealers and Brasher's submitted claims to Western Surety on behalf of the
seven consumers who did not receive certificates of title to their vehicles
purchased from Best of the Best.

Dealers submitted its claim to Western Surety on September 19, 2008, attaching the June
2008, purchase order to Best of the Best for seven vehicles, along with a statement showing a
retumedcheckfor$8,810.00 issued by Best of the Best. (Snyder Aff., Ex. C, R. Vol. II, pp. 129-32.)
Dealers submitted a more thorough claim on October 10, 2008,5 requesting payment pursuant to J.C.
§ 49-1610, on the basis that Best of the Best violated multiple Idaho Code sections, "including but
not limited to J.C.§ 49-1609A and§ 49-1613 by knowingly transferring vehicles without satisfying
its obligations to Dealer's [sic]." (Snyder Aff., Ex. C-1, R. Vol. II, p. 133.) In addition, Dealers
asserted that Best of the Best intended to defraud Dealers, as demonstrated by the "continuous
payment of insufficient funds by way of check." (Id.)

s On that same date, Best of the Best returned its Notice of Premium Due statement to Western Surety, with
a note to cancel the bond. (Snyder Aff., Ex. B-1, R. Vol. II, p. 128.) Western Surety notified Best of the Best on
October 20, 2008, that it had received the request to cancel the bond and the bond would be cancelled and voided as
of November 28, 2008. (Snyder Aff., Ex. B, R Vol. II, p. 127.}
-6-

When Western Surety receives a claim from an individual, an auto auction, or ITD, it first
notifies the principal of the claim and requests that the principal provide it with any bona fide
defenses that it may have. (Snyder Aff., Cf[ 6.d, R. Vol. II, p. 117.) In accordance with its practice,
by letter dated October 16, 2008, Western Surety notified Best of the Best of the claim from Dealers
and requested that the principal provide it with any defenses to the claim it might have. (Snyder Aff.,
Ex. E, R. Vol. II, p. 138.) The letter further informed Best of the Best that Western Surety needed
a response by November 6, 2008, or it "may need to assume the correctness of this claim, arrange
a settlement to the extent of our liability, and then look to you under the terms of the indemnity
agreement for full and immediate reimbursement." (Id.) Best of the Best did not respond to this
request by Western Surety. (Id.; Snyder Aff., Ex. P, R. Vol. II, p. 161.)
Western Surety also responded to Dealers on October 16, 2008, requesting further support
for its claim. (Snyder Aff., Ex. D,R. Vol. II, pp.135-36.) Western Surety also stated: "In the event
that you are unable to present Western with evidence to sufficiently establish fraud or fraudulent
representation, you can also establish the validity of your claim by providing us with a certified copy
of a final judgment." (Id.)
On November 13, 2008, Brasher's submitted its claim to Western Surety. (Snyder Aff., Ex.
F, R. Vol. II, pp. 139-43.) The claim stated:
Brasher's Idaho Auto Auction is making claim on Best of the Best
Auto Sales bond #69815964 in the amount of $9,360. This
dealership bought three units from Brasher' s Idaho Auto Auction, the
units have been retailed and we are in possession of the titles. Best
of the Best collected the money from the retail customer. We are in
possession of a returned check from Best of the Best Auto Sales.
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Your consideration of this fraudulent matter is greatly appreciated.
The retail customers are in need of their titles.
(Snyder Aff., Ex. F, R. Vol. II, p. 139.)
Western Surety responded to Brasher' s on January 9, 2009, requesting further support for its
claim and informing Brasher' s, as it had informed Dealers, that if it was unable to provide evidence
to establish a violation of the bond, it could also establish the validity of the claim by obtaining a
judgment. (Snyder Aff., Ex. G, R. Vol. II, pp. 144-45.) On that date, Western Surety also notified
Best of the Best of the claim from Brasher's, and again requested by letter that Best of the Best
provide it with any defenses to the claim it might have. (Snyder Aff., Ex. H, R. Vol. II, p. 146.) The
letter further informed Best of the Best that Western Surety needed a response by January 29, 2009,
or it "may need to assume the correctness of this claim, arrange a settlement to the extent of our
liability, and then look to you under the terms of the indemnity agreement for full and immediate
reimbursement." (Id.)
Best of the Best never responded to this letter and request from Western Surety. (Id.; Snyder

Aff., Ex. P, R. Vol. II, p. 161.)
On January 20, 2009, the Brasher's representative emailed Western Surety's claim
representative, Robert Sobraske, and informed Sobraske that he had contacted two of the three
consumers and expected to hear from the third consumer soon. (Snyder Aff., Ex. I, R. Vol. II, p.
147 .) As discussed previously, one of the customers, Brian Shaw, directly contacted Western Surety
on January 26, 2009, stating a claim for $6,085.00 for the vehicle he purchased from Best of the Best
on May 10, 2008, as his title had not been provided to him. (Snyder Aff., Ex. J, R. Vol. II, p. 148.)
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The three customers also each provided their respective Report of Sale and Application for
Certificate of Title from Best of the Best to Western Surety in support of their claims. (Snyder Aff.,
Ex. J-1, R. Vol. II, pp. 149-51.)
On May 4, 2009, Sobraske sent an email to counsel for Dealers stating that Western Surety
had received a phone call from Selena Mata regarding the 1995 GMC that she and her husband
purchased from Best of the Best. (Snyder Aff., Ex. M, R. Vol. II, p. 157.) Sobraske indicated that
Western Surety would issue payment in exchange for the release of the title to the Matas' vehicle.
(Id.) Dealers responded with a list of the four customers, including Ms. Mata, who had not yet

received title to their vehicles and stated that the customers had been notified to contact Western
Surety regarding the matter. (Id.)
Best of the Best never provided Western Surety with a bona fide defense to the claims.
(Snyder Aff., Ex. P, R. Vol. II, p. 161.)
C.

The Idaho Transportation Department expects sureties to process claims that
are not based on judgments.

Western Surety regularly receives and pays claims on motor vehicle dealer bonds in Idaho
without receiving judgments from claimants. (Snyder Aff.,

CJ[

6.c, R. Vol. II, p. 117.) The Idaho

Transportation Department, Dealer Operations and Investigations Division, frequentlyforwards these
claims to Western Surety. (Snyder Aff., !][ 6.a, R. Vol. II, p. 116.) ITD refers to the consumer
complaints it forwards to Western Surety as "claims," and asks to be informed of all settlements of
such claims. (Snyder Aff., !J[ 6.b, R. Vol. II, p. 116.) Daryl Marler, the Dealer Operations Program
Supervisor at ITD, admits that when his department sends a "consumer complaint" about motor

-9-

vehicle dealer conduct to a surety, it refers to it as a "bond claim." (Evett Aft., Marler Dep., p. 31,

1. 6 - p. 32, 1. 5, R. Vol. I, pp. 81-82.)
Over the last five years, Mr. Marler only recalls forwarding approximately 3 or 4 actual
judgments to sureties for processing. (Evett Aff., Marler Dep., p. 41, 11. 13-18, R. Vol. I, p. 84) In
that same period he has forwarded probably between 60 and 80 "consumer complaints" (referred to
as "claims" by ITD) to sureties for processing. (Evett Aff., Marler Dep., p. 41, 1. 19 - p. 42, 1. 3, R.
Vol. I, p. 84.) Even though Mr. Marler has "constantly" referred to Chapter 16 of Title 49, Idaho
Code (Evett Aff., MarlerDep., p. 49, 1. 13 - p. 50, 1. 8, R. Vol. I, p. 86), ITO has never told Western
Surety that only claims based on judgments are valid claims. (Snyder Aff., <[ 6.j, R. Vol. II, p. 118.)
Mr. Marler testified that ITD expects sureties to respond to the claims it forwards to them. (Evett
Aff., Marler Dep., p. 38, 11. 17-23, R. Vol. I, p. 83.)
After receiving a claim forwarded from ITD, Western Surety notifies the bond principal (the
motor vehicle dealer) of the claim. (Snyder Aff., <[ 6.d, R. Vol. II, p. 117 .) If the principal does not
dispute the claim or offer a bona fide defense, Western Surety determines the amount justly due to
the claimant and tenders a settlement amount to the claimant. (Id.)
If the bond claimant cannot provide Western Surety with adequate evidence of a violation
of LC. §§ 49-1608 and 49-1610, Western Surety informs the claimant of the option of pursuing a
right of action to obtain a judgment from the principal. (Snyder Aff., <[ 6.e, R. Vol. II, p. 117.)
Claims where a consumer has not received title are particularly important for Western Surety
to resolve quickly, because without title a consumer often has difficulties obtaining insurance,
registering a vehicle, or satisfying a lender's lien requirements. (Snyder Aff., <[ 6.f, R. Vol. II, p.
-10-

117 .) Mr. Snyder has personally had contact with consumer claimants on motor vehicle dealer bonds
who were desperate to obtain a title they had not received from a dealer. (Snyder Aff., err 6.g, R. Vol.
Il, p. 117.) Given the importance to consumers of getting a title, the least helpful thing Western
Surety could do would be to force a claimant to file a lawsuit, at some expense, to prove what
everyone already knows, which is that the claimant does not have a title. (Snyder Aff., err 6.h, R. Vol.

n, p. 117.)
This is ITD's experience as well. Mr. Marler describes consumers not receiving their titles
as a "major concem" for ITD, and the department tries to do whatever it talces to get a consumer a
valid title. (Evett Aff., Marler Dep., p. 44, I. 1 - p. 45, I. 5, R. Vol. I, p. 85.) Mr. Marler has had
personal contact with such consumers and they were all "desperate" to get their titles. (Evett Aff.,
MarlerDep., p. 44, 11. 1-13, R. Vol. I, p. 85.)
When Western Surety settles a claim forwarded to it by ITD, it informs ITD of any
settlements it has made, as requested by ITD in the form by which it transmits claims. (Snyder Aff.,
err 6.i, R. Vol. Il, p. 118.) ITD has never told Westem Surety that its process for paying claims is

improper, inadequate, or in violation of the law, nor has ITD told Western Surety that it may only
pay claims based on judgments. (Snyder Aff., «]16.j, R. Vol. IT, p. 118.)
d.

There is no dispute that the Dealers and Brasher' s claims were valid and paid
in good faith under I.e.§ 41-1839(3).

On March 11, 2009, Western Surety issued a Final Release and Assignment in the amount
of $9,360.00 to Brasher' s, for the release of the three certificates of title to Brian Shaw and Trista
Jacobsen, the Stuckis, and the Yanzuks. (Snyder Aff., Ex. K, R. Vol. Il, pp. 152-53.) On April 14,
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2009, Western Surety sent a letter to Best of the Best, informing it that Western Surety paid
$9,360.00 under the bond to Brasher's because Best of the Best failed to respond to the letter dated
January 9, 2009. and did not provide the surety with a bona fide defense. (Snyder Aff., Ex. L, R.
Vol. II, p. 154.)
Through continued negotiations with Western Surety, Dealers agreed on May 28, 2009, to
release the titles to the four remaining consumers for a payment of $10,640.00, the amount remaining
on the bond. (Snyder Aff., Ex. M, R. Vol. II, pp. 155-57.) Western Surety issued its Final Release
and Assignment in the amount of $10,640.00 to Dealers on June 12, 2009, and the titles were
provided to the four consumers. (Snyder Aff., Ex. N, R. Vol. II, pp. 158-59.)
On July 23, 2009, Western Surety sent a final letter to Best of the Best informing it that
Western Surety had paid $10,640.00 to Dealers and $9,360.00 to Brasher' s, and these payments were
made under the motor vehicle dealer bond because Best of the Best "failed to provide the surety with
a bona fide defense." (Snyder A.ff., Ex. P, R. Vol. II, p. 161.)
On July 23, 2009, Western Surety also sent a letter to ITD, informing ITD that it issued a
check in the amount of $10,640.00 to Dealers on June 11, 2009, and had previously issued a check
in the amountof$9,360.00 to Brasher's on March 24, 2009. (Snyder Aff.,Ex. O,R. Vol. II, p. 160.)
ITD asks sureties to keep it infonned of settlements of claims so that ITD can verify that the bond
is restored to the $20,000.00 level required for dealer licensing after payments are made on the bond.
(Evett Aff., Marler Dep., p. 32, II. 11-21, R. Vol. I, p. 82.)
Here, the bond had already been cancelled, so the payments of $20,000.00 exhausted Western
Surety's liability under the bond. (Snyder Aff., Ex. 0, R. Vol. II, p. 160.)
-12-

Best of the Best did not dispute payment of the Dealers and Brasher' s claims. Best of the
Best has not disputed that it failed to provide title to its customers or offered any defenses for its
actions. Western Surety does not require a claimant to file a lawsuit at his or her own expense to
obtain a judgment to prove liability that is not disputed. (See Snyder Aff., <j[ 6.h, R. Vol. II, p. 117.)

3.

Hestead submitted his claim on the motor vehicle dealer bond after Western
Surety exhausted the bond through its payments on the valid, undisputed claims
presented by Dea1ers and Brasher's.

Hestead purchased his truck on June 8, 2007, through Best of the Best. (Evett Aff., Ex. C,
Deposition of Nick Hestead ("Hestead Dep."), p. 6, IL 16-25, R. Vol. I, p. 99.) Several months after
Hestead purchased the truck, he attempted to trade it in at a dealership. (Evett Aff., Hestead Dep .•
p. 12, l. 22 - p. 13, l. 8, R. Vol. I, p. 101.) At the dealership, he was informed that the truck was
branded as a "lemon." (Evett Aff., Hestead Dep.• p. 14, 11. 11-20, R. Vol. I, p. 101.) Subsequent to
that discovery, Hestead contacted Ririe and explained to him that he had tried to trade the truck in,
butthetruckhada"badtitle." (EvettAff.,HesteadDep.,p.16,1.21-p.17,l. 10,R. Vol.I,p.102.)
Ririe stated that when he purchased the truck at auction, it had a "green light," so there should not
be any problems with the title. (Evett Aff., Hestead Dep., p. 18, 11. 2-7, R. Vol. I, p. 102.) Hestead
did not have any further contact with Ririe, Zechmann, Best of the Best, or Western Surety regarding
the truck title. (Evett Aff., Hestead Dep., p. 18, l. 8 - p. 19, l. 5, p. 22, l. 2 - p. 23, L 14, R. Vol. I,
pp. 102-03.)
Hestead filed suit against Ron Zechmann dba Best of the Best Auto Sales on September 2,
2008. (Snyder Aff., Ex. Q-1, R. Vol. II, pp. 168-71.)
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On August 31, 2009, Hestead submitted a claim to ITO, based on two discovery-related
orders, not judgments, issued in the lawsuit against Zechmann, in the amount of $877 .70. (Snyder
Aff., Ex. Q, R. Vol. II, pp. 162-66.) Western Surety first learned of the suit on September 3, 2009,
when it received the August 31, 2009, claim from ITD. (Id.)
The ITD letter accompanying Hestead' s claim stated that the "claim is an act that occurred
during the time when the bond was in force" and that ITD "does not take a position as [sic] the
validity of any claim." (Snyder Aff., Ex. Q, R. Vol. II, p. 162.) The letter also requested that
Western Surety inform ITD of any settlements or payments made in the matter. (ld.) 6
The orders submitted by Hestead to ITD on August 31, 2009, were not judgments. (See
Snyder Aff., Ex. Q, R. Vol. II, pp. 162-66.) The orders consisted of an order awarding attorney fees
and costs to Hestead, and an order relating to stipulations made at the scheduling conference.
(Snyder Aff., Ex. Q, R. Vol. II, pp. 164-66.) Yet, Hestead took the position before the district court
that a surety may only issue payment on a claim based on a final judgment. (Mem. in Supp. of Mot.
for Summ. J., R. Vol. I, p. 21.) The total amount of the initial claim submitted by Hestead to ITD
and Western Surety was $877.70. (Snyder Aff., Ex. Q, R. Vol. II, p. 162.)
Western Surety denied Hestead's claim in a letter dated September 14, 2009, stating that it
had previously issued two settlement payments, which exhausted the $20,000.00 bond. (Snyder Aff.,
Ex. S, R. Vol. II, p. 173.) Western Surety also sent a letter to ITD on that date informing it of

6

This is a form letter used by ITD in forwarding claims to sureties, and it is used regardless of whether the
claim is based on a judgment or simply a consumer complaint. (Evett Aff., Marler Dep., p. 30, 1. 15 - p.32, 1. 18, R.
Vol. I, pp. 81-82.) The vast majority of "bond claims" that ITD forwards to sureties are simply based on consumer
complaints, not judgments. (Evett Aff., Marler Dep., p. 41, I. 13 - p. 42, I. 3, R. Vol. I, p. 84.)
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Western Surety's denial of Hestead' s claim on the basis of exhaustion of the bond. (Snyder Aff., Ex.
R, R. Vol. II, p. 172.)
On September 17, 2009, Hestead responded to Western Surety, arguing that I.C. § 49-1610
requires a judgment, even though he had already submitted a claim without a judgment, and that if
the previous payments were based on claims without judgments, the bond was "still on the hook"
for $20,000.00. (Snyder Aff., Ex. T, R. Vol. II, p. 174.)
On March 9, 2010, judgment was entered against Zechmann dba Best of the Best Auto Sales
and the court found that Hestead' s damages were $12,500.00, plus interest at the rate ofl0.9% since
June 8, 2007, in the amount of $3,729.00, and sales tax damage of $750.00. (Snyder Aff., Ex. V,
R. Vol. II, pp. 178-79.) On April 8, 2010, Hestead submitted his claim for $16,979.00 in damages,
along with $7,525.00 in attorney fees and $503.49 in costs, directly to Western Surety. (Snyder Aff.,
Ex. V, R. Vol. II, pp. 176-77.) In support of the claim, Hestead attached the certified judgment

entered March 9, 2010; a March 5, 2010, letter to Zechmann requesting that Zechmann assign to
Hestead any claims on Zechmann' s Farmers liability insurance policy and any claims against Morgan
Ririe; and a Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys Fees. (Snyder Aff., Ex. V, R. Vol. II, pp. 178-86.)
On April 19, 2010, Western Surety reaffirmed its position that the statutes do not prohibit
it from paying a claim until after a judgment is entered. (Snyder Aff., Ex. W, R. Vol. II, p. 187.)
On June 7, 2010, Hestead sent a letter stating that the April 8, 2010, claim was under the name "Ron
Zechman [sic] dbaBest of the Best Auto Sales" and thus, to strictly comply with the bonding statute,
Hestead also obtained a judgment against "Best of the Best Auto Sales Inc." in the amount of
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$25,007.49. 7 (Snyder Aff.,Ex. X,R. Vol. II, pp.188-89.) In support of the amendedclaim,Hestead
submitted the May 6, 2010, certified judgment against Best of the Best Auto Sales Inc., and a May
7, 2010, letter to Zechmann requesting payment on the judgment. (Snyder Aff., Ex. X, R. Vol. II,
pp. 190-92.)

Western Surety again reaffirmed its position and denial of the claim on June 14, 2010.

(Snyder Aff., Ex. Y, R. Vol. II, p. 193.)

C.

Course of Proceedings.
Hestead filed his Complaint and Jury Demand against Western Surety on June 21, 2010.

(Compl., R. Vol. I, pp. 4-8.) Western Surety filed its Answer and Demand for Jury Trial on July 30,
2010. (Answer, R. Vol. I, pp. 9-14.) Hestead filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on October
13, 2010. (Mot. for Summ. J., R. Vol. I, pp. 15-16; Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., R. Vol.

I, pp. 20-26.)
Western Surety responded on November 29, 2010, with its Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (Def.'s Mem. inOpp'n to Pl.'s
Mot. for Summ. J. and in Supp. of Def.'s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., R. Vol. II, pp. 194-224.)
Plaintiff responded on December 3, 2010. (Reply Mem. to Def.'s Mem., R. Vol. II, pp. 225-34.)
The motions were heard on December 10, 2010. (Tr., Vol. I.)
At the hearing, the court made the following ruling:
The defendant paid the $20,000 motor vehicle dealer bond to
settle claims, and those claims have not been reduced to judgment.

7

This amount was arrived at by adding attorney fees of$7,525.00 and costs of$503.49 to the previous
judgment amount of $16,979.00. (See Snyder Aff., Ex. X, R. Vol. II, pp. 190-91.)
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And, certainly, the Court wouldn't find that Surety acted with
any intent to defraud or any bad faith manner contained in those
claims.
There is no Idaho law, I guess, any other law, other than what
Mr. Gannon cited on this issue, and I have tried to weigh the policy
reasons on both sides, and I find it to be a very difficult decision to
make, because I think it is not clear.
But what I come down to is that we have got a specific statute
that addresses in this case how to present a claim to the corporate
surety, and for this specific type of case where it is the motor vehicle
statute.
So my ruling is or what I find is, 49-1610 specifically requires
certain actions before a claim can be paid. It specifically requires a
final judgment. It sets forth how the claim is to be filed, and when it
is supposed to be filed.
I didn't highlight all of the times that it mentions 'judgment,"
but there are at least four contained in subsection 4 at 49-1610. It
clearly requires a judgment.
So it is the ruling of this court that the claims that were paid
out by the defendant were not pursuant to a judgment; therefore, did
not comply with 49-1610.
And, therefore, I will award summary judgment to the
plaintiff.

Mr. Evett: To put it out there, I think if the court's ruling is-if
I heard you correctly-the Court has said you can't find that the earlier
payments were made in bad faith.
Court: Right. I don't think they were made in bad faith-I just
don't think they were made pursuant to the statute.
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They were made in good faith, but they don't comply with the
statute. I guess I wanted to make sure that it was understood that I
didn't find that the defendant somehow made some preferential
payment, I don't find that. But they don't comply with the statute, I
guess is my ruling.
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 18, I. 24 - p. 21, I. 16.)
On December 16, 2010, the district court issued judgment in favor ofHestead in the amount
of $12,500.00,8 granting Hestead' s motion for summary judgment and rendering Western Surety's
cross-motion moot. (J., R. Vol. II, p. 250.)

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Whether the district court erred in granting Hestead summary judgment.

B.

Whether the district court erred in holding Western Surety liable in excess of the aggregate
liability of $20,000.00 set by LC. § 49-1608 when it paid the claims in good faith and its
liability was not varied by contract or statute.

C.

Whether Western Surety is entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839(4),

III. ARGUMENT
The purpose ofl.C. §§ 49-1610 and41-1839 is to encourage sureties to timely pay claimants
for violations of the motor vehicle dealer statutes. The rule Hestead proposes - that sureties must
insist on strict procedural compliance by claimants - would discourage sureties from paying valid
claims. This issue is at the heart of this appeal.
Western Surety complied with I.C. §§ 49-1610 and 41-1839 when it paid the valid,
undisputed claims of the seven consumers before Hestead submitted his claim. Hestead argued that

8

The court awarded what it described as "just the initial hann or amount of damage, and that would be the
$12,500." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 20, II. 13-14.)
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the payments were "volunteer'' payments because they were not based upon a judgment as he claims
LC.§ 49-1610 requires. (See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., R. Vol. I, p. 24; Snyder Aff., Ex.
V, R. Vol. II, p. 177 .) Hestead asserted that, therefore, Western Surety could not "offset its improper
payments" and was still liable under the bond. (Id.)
However, LC.§ 41-1839(3) governs surety payments and does not require that a claimant
first obtain a judgment before filing a claim with a surety. Furthermore, the statute provides that
payments made by a surety in "good faith" after a determination of the amount justly due to a
claimant are not volunteer payments. The district court expressly found that Western Surety paid
the Dealers and Brasher' s claims in good faith, and Hestead has never disputed that the claims paid
before his were valid. (See Tr., Vol. I, p. 20, 1. 25 - p. 21, 1. 16.)
Therefore, there was no legal basis for the district court's grant of summary judgment to
Hestead.

A.

Standard of Review.
"The standard of review on appeal from a summary judgment is the same standard used by

the district court in rendering its decision." Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, _, 245 P.3d 1009,
1011 (2011). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Where the evidence
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question oflaw remains, over which the Idaho
Supreme Court exercises free review. Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 504, 112 P.3d 788, 792
(2005).
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This appeal presents pure issues of law for this Court to decide.

B.

The District Court Erred in Granting Hestead Summary .Tud21Pent Because I.C. §§ 491610 and 41-1839 Do Not Require That a Surety Require a .Judgment Before Paying
An Undisputed Claim.
The standard for statutory interpretation is as follows:
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which {the
Court] exercise[ s] free review. This Court must construe a statute to
give effect to the intent of the legislature. It must begin with the
literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain,
usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a
whole. Statutes that are in pari materia must be construed together
to effect legislative intent. Statutes are in pari materia if they relate
to the same subject.

Paolini v. Albertson's Inc., 143 Idaho 547, 549, 149 P .3 d 822, 824 (2006) (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added).

In Rogers v. Household Life Insurance Co., the Court stated that in analyzing the statutory
language relating to the capacity of an incapacitated person to contract, the Court must consider the
entire statutory framework relating to persons who suffer from impaired capacity and their ability
to make decisions regarding the conduct of their lives. 150 Idaho 735, _, 250 P.3 d 786, 788 (2011).
Thus, the statutory language must be evaluated in the context of statutes that are in pari materia.
The plain meaning of a statute will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is
contrary or unless the plain meaning leads to absurd results. Mattoon v. Blades, 145 Idaho 634, 636,
181 P.3d 1242, 1244 (2008). Where a statute is ambiguous, the Court may examine the language
used, the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, and the policy behind the statutes. Id. The
Court will avoid an interpretation that would lead to an absurd or unreasonably harsh result or render
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a statute a nullity. In re Daniel W, 145 Idaho 677, 680, 183 P.3d 765, 768 (2008); see also Johnson

v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455,461,210 P.3d 563,569 (Ct. App. 2009).
Idaho Code § 41-1839(3) defines the standards for a surety's conduct in making payments
under a bond. The statute applies to actions against sureties arising out of surety contracts, governs
attorney fees awarded against sureties based upon their handling of claims, and provides that
payments made to a claimant in good faith are not volunteer payments. J.C.§ 41-1839(3). The
purpose of J.C. § 41-1839 is to encourage insurers to settle claims to avoid the high costs of
litigation. See Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244, 247, 61 P.3d 601, 604
(2002).
The general purpose of the motor vehicle dealer bond requirement, and LC. § 49-1610 in
particular, is to provide a remedy to any person who suffers a loss as a result of a dealer's fraud. See

Bryant Motors, Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Cos., 118 Idaho 796,799,800 P.2d 683,686 (Ct. App. 1990).
Thus, J.C.§ 41-1839 and J.C.§ 49-1610 both relate to the handling of claims made under a
motor vehicle dealer bond. Therefore, the statutes must be construed together, as they are in pari
materia. See Rogers v. Household Life Ins. Co., 150 Idaho 735, __, 250 P.3d 786, 788 (2011).

1.

Idaho Code§ 41-1839 governs a surety's payments under a bond.

Idaho Code § 49-1610 does not address the legal standard for payment of surety claims. It
is silent in that regard. Idaho Code§ 41-18399 does. The intent ofl.C. § 41-1839 is to encourage

9

Hestead first requested attorney fees in his Complaint pursuant to J.C. § 41-1839 (Comp!., R. Vol. I, pp. 68), but then, recognizing that he needed to avoid application of J.C. § 41-1839, argued that the statute did not apply
because it does not allow direct actions against sureties. (Pl.'s Consent to Shorten Time and Resp. to Mot., R. Vol. I,
p. 64.) Hestead then asserted it did not apply because he had not complied with its time limitations. (Reply Mem. to
Def.'s Mem., R. Vol. II, pp. 228-29.)
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sureties to determine, within 60 days, the amount of a claim that is justly due to a claimant. See LC.
§ 41-1839(3). Such payments, when made in good faith, are not volunteer payments.

Idaho Code§ 41-1839 provides, in pertinent part:
(1) Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance,
surety, guaranty or indemnity of any kind or nature whatsoever, which
shall fail for a period of thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been
furnished as provided in such policy, certificate or contract, to pay to
the person entitled thereto the amount justly due under such policy,
certificate or contract, shall in any action thereafter brought against
the insurer in any court in this state or in any arbitration for recovery
under the terms of the policy, certificate or contract, pay such further
amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in
such action or arbitration.

(3) ....This section shall not apply to actions or arbitrations against
surety insurers by creditors of or claimants against a principal and
arising out of a surety or guaranty contract issued by the insurer as to
such principal, unless such creditors or claimants shall have notified
the surety of their claim, in writing, at least sixty (60) days prior to
such action or arbitration against the surety. The surety shall be
authorized to determine what portion or amount of such claim is
justly due the creditor or claimant and payment or tender of the
amount so determined by the surety shall not be deemed a volunteer
payment and shall not prejudice any right of the surety to
indemnification and/or subrogation so long as such determination
and payment by the surety be made in good faith. Nor shall this
section apply to actions or arbitrations against fidelity insurers by
claimants against a principal and arising out of a fidelity contract or
policy issued by the insurer as to such principal unless the liability of
the principal has been acknowledged by him in writing or otherwise
established by judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.
I.C. § 41-1839(1)-(3) (emphasis added).
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a.

Idaho Code§ 41-1839(3) requires a surety to evaluate a claim submitted to
it by a claimant and determine the amount justly due without forcing a
claimant to incur the high costs of litigation.

To avoid paying attorney fees under I.C. § 41-1839(3), a surety must evaluate all claims
presented to it and determine the amount justly due to not just creditors of a principal, but also
claimants against a principal. Only with respect to fidelity insurers does the statute narrow the scope
of claims that carry the risk of a fee award. (See I.C. § 41-1839(3 ), which provides that it does not
apply to claims against fidelity insurers where the principal has not acknowledged liability in writing
or had liability established by ajudgment.) 10
The legislative history of LC.§ 41-1839(3) further supports that the purpose of the modern
version of subparagraph (3) is to encourage insurers to handle all claims, not just those based on
judgments, or run the risk of a fee award. When the Idaho Legislature first enacted J.C.§ 41-1839
in 1961, subsection (3) provided as follows: "This section shall not apply to actions against surety
insurers by creditors of or claimants against a principal and arising out of a surety or guaranty
contract issued by the insurer as to such principal, unless the liability of the principal has been
acknowledged by him in writing or otherwise established by judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction." H.B. 182, 36th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Id. 1961). In 1965, the legislature amended the
statute by removing the prerequisite that entitlement to attorney fees required a judgment or written
acknowledgment of liability, and by providing that payments made in "good faith" were not

10

Stated differently, I.C. § 41-1839(3) says to sureties that they must handle all claims by third parties and
are subject to fee awards for violating the statute, with the exception of claims against fidelity insurers, which must
be accompanied by a written acknowledgment of liability by the principal or a judgment. Hestead's argument is
premised on the idea that Western Surety should not have paid the Dealers and Brasher's claims, even though I.C. §
41-1839(3) requires Western Surety to process these claims.
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volunteer payments and did not affect the surety's indemnity rights against the principal. H.B. 66,
37th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Id. 1965).

In all circumstances, with the exception of fidelity claims, the surety must handle a claim
whether or not it is based on a judgment, or run the risk of a fee award.
Through his proposed interpretation of LC. § 49-1610, Hestead would insert the pre-1965
requirement back into LC.§ 41-1839, and encourage sureties to delay or refuse to pay claims that
are not based on judgments, even when no one disputes the validity of a claim.
Precedent interpreting J.C. § 41-1839 demonstrates that the purpose of the statute is to
encourage sureties and insurers to pay claims without forcing claimants into litigation and its ensuing
costs. This Court has held: "The purpose of the statute is to provideanincentiveforinsurers to settle
just claims in order to reduce the amount of litigation and the high costs associated with litigation."

Martin v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244,247, 61 P.3d 601, 604 (2002). Avoiding
the high costs associated with litigation is necessary "to prevent the sum that is due the insured under
the policy from being diminished by expenditures for the services of an attorney." Walton v.

Hartford Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 616,620, 818 P.2d 320,324 (1991), overruled on other grounds by
Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 1127 (2006).
This Court long ago held that LC. § 41-1839(3) applies to statutory bond claims. The statute
applies to'" [a]ny insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance, surety, guaranty or
indemnity of any kind of nature whatsoever.... ' An 'insurer' includes a surety." Smith v. Great

Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 282, 561 P.2d 1299, 1315 (1977) (quoting I.C. § 41-1839).

In Great Basin, the defendant argued that I. C. § 41-1839 did not permit an award of attorney
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fees against the surety company because the bond in that case was required by the Bonded
Warehouse Law and thus J.C.§ 41-1839 did not apply. 98 Idaho at 281,561 P.2d at 1314; see, e.g.,
LC. § 69-209. The defendants argued that the omission of a provision for attorney fees in the
Bonded Warehouse Law controlled over the general provision for attorney fees found in LC. § 411839. Great Basin, 98 Idaho at 281, 561 P.3d at 1314.
The Court rejected this argument, finding that LC. § 41-1839 applies to all insurance
contracts, including surety bonds, despite the fact that the bond was issued pursuant to the Bonded
Warehouse Law. Id. at 282,561 P.3d at 1315. This logic applies here: LC.§ 41-1839(3) applies to
a surety's handling of a bond claim under LC.§ 49-1610.
The purpose of Idaho Code § 49-1839(3) is to encourage the quick payment of valid bond
claims, which is what Western Surety did when it paid the Dealers and Brasher's claims. Given that
the purpose of LC. § 41-1839(3) is to encourage sureties to timely pay claims, it would be absurd to
rule that the statutes require a surety to force claimants victimized by an undisputed statutory violation

to prove what everyone already knows in litigation.
b.

Western Surety paid the Dealers and Brasher's claims in good faith under I.e.
§ 41-1839(3).

Idaho Code§ 41-1839 provides that payments made by a surety in "good faith" shall not be
considered "volunteer" payments. This is crucial, because the sole legal theory advanced by Hestead
as to why Western Surety had to pay twice on its bond was because the payments on the Dealers and
Brasher's claims were made as a "volunteer." (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. forSumm. J., R. Vol. I,p. 24;
Snyder Aff., Ex. V, R. Vol. Il, p. 177.) Idaho Code§ 41-1839(3), however, provides a surety with
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the flexibility to pay claims in "good faith," which is understandable given that the purpose of LC.
§ 41-1839 is to encourage insurers and sureties to pay claims.

Because the district court found that Western Surety paid the Dealers and Brasher's claims
in good faith, its grant of summary judgment was in error.
fu Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. North Pacific Insurance Co., the Idaho Supreme Court
described the elements of bad faith: "To establish the tort of bad faith, the party asserting the tort
must demonstrate the following elements: (1) the insurance company intentionally and unreasonably
denied or delayed payment of a claim; (2) the claim was not fairly debatable; (3) the denial or delay
was not the result of a good faith mistake; and (4) the resulting harm was not fully compensable by
contract damages." 11 145 Idaho 241,246 n.1, 178 P.3d 606,611 n.1 (2008).
There is no dispute that Western Surety paid the Dealers and Brasher' s claims in good faith.
The district court so found, and Hestead has not challenged that finding on appeal. (See Tr., Vol. I,
p. 20, 1. 25 - p. 21, 1. 16.)
Here, there is no dispute that Best of the Best violated provisions of LC.§§ 49-1608(1) and
49-1610(1) when it failed to provide title to its customers. Idaho Code§ 49-1608(1) provides that
a dealer must not "practice any fraud, make any fraudulent representation or violate any of the
provisions of this chapter, rules of the department, or the provisions of chapter 5, title 49, section 491418, or chapter 6, title 48, Idaho Code...." LC. § 49-1608(1). Similarly, I.C. § 49-1610(1)
provides:
11

The doctrine of bad faith has also been applied to sureties in the cases of Luzar v. Western Surety Co.,
107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d 337 (1984), and Martin v. Lyons, 98 Idaho 102,558 P.2d 1063 (1977).

-26-

If any person shall suffer any loss or damage by reason of any fraud
practiced on him or fraudulent representation made to him by a
licensed dealer... or shall suffer any loss or damage by reason of the
violation by the dealer... of any of the provisions of this chapter, or
chapter 5, title 49, Idaho Code, or section 49-1418, Idaho Code, or
chapter 6, title 48, Idaho Code, or any applicable rule or regulation
of the board, or federal odometer law or regulation, that person shall
have a right of action against the dealer and his salesman.
I.C. § 49-1610(1) (emphasis added).
Best of the Best violated I.C. §§ 49-502, 49-1609A, and 49-1613 by not delivering title to the
customers upon the sale of the vehicles. Idaho Code§ 49-502(1) requires that certificate of title be
delivered upon sale of a vehicle: "No person shall sell or otherwise dispose of a vehicle without
delivery to the purchaser or transferee a certificate of title with an assignment as necessary to show
title in the purchaser or transferee." I.C. § 49-502(1). 12
Similarly, I.C. § 49-1609A provides:
(1) When a motor vehicle dealer licensed pursuant to this chapter takes

possession of a vehicle for purposes of resale, the dealer shall have ten
(10) business days from the date of possession to satisfy in full any and
all lienholders who are perfected at the time of taking possession,
unless the owner relinquishing possession of the vehicle agrees in
writing to directly pay the perfected lienholder.
(2) No such vehicle shall be resold or transferred to any retail
purchaser until all perfected liens have been satisfied in full.
LC.§ 49-1609A(l)-(2). Idaho Code§ 49-1613 further provides:
It shall be unlawful for the holder of any license issued under the
provisions of this chapter to: ... G) Display for sale, exchange, or sell
any vehicle for which the vehicle dealer does not hold title or
12

In his deposition l\1r. Marler said the law requires provision of title within 30 days of purchase, which
Best of the Best did not do. (Evett Aff., Marler Dep., p. 14, l. 22 - p. 15, l. 3, R. Vol. I, p. 77.)
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consignment agreement or other documentary evidence of his right to
the possession of every vehicle in his possession.
LC. § 49-1613(1)0).
The Dealers and Brasher' s claimants provided documentation to Western Surety showing that
they paid for the respective vehicles and did not receive title. (Snyder Aff., Ex. J., R. Vol. II, p. 148;
Snyder Aff., Ex. J-1, R. Vol. II. pp. 149-51; Snyder Aff., Ex. M, R. Vol. II, pp. 155-57.) Dealers and
Brasher' s still held the titles to the vehicles because Best of the Best had not satisfied its debts to them
in full. (Snyder Aff.• Ex. C, R. Vol. II, pp. 129-32; Snyder Aff., Ex. F, R. Vol. II, pp. 139-43.) Best
of the Best never disputed that it did not provide titles to the consumers. (Snyder Aff., Ex. E, R. Vol.

II, p. 138; Snyder Aff., Ex. H, R. Vol. II, p.146.) Therefore, Best of the Best violated I.e.§§ 49-502,
49-1609A, and 49-1613.
Additionally, Best of the Best violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act ("ICP A") by
engaging in deceptive business practices against both the consumers and Dealers and Brasher' s. The
purpose of the ICPA is "to protect both consumers and businesses against unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of trade or commerce, and to
provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection." I. C. § 48-601; see also Fenn

v. Noah, 142 Idaho 775, 780, 133 P.3d 1240, 1245 (2006) ("The ICPA should be construed
liberally."). An act or practice is "unfair" if it is shown to possess a tendency or capacity to deceive
consumers. State ex rel. Kidwell v. Master Distribs., Inc., 101 Idaho 447,453,615 P.2d 116, 122
(1980). Proof of intention to deceive is not required for finding that an act is unfair or deceptive. Id.
at 453-54, 615 P.2d at 122-23.
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Best of the Best's acts showed a tendency or capacity to deceive both the consumers and the
auto auction businesses. Best of the Best wrote multiple checks to Dealers and Brasher's that were
based on insufficient funds, showing a tendency to deceive the businesses when it purchased the
vehicles in April and June of 2008. (Snyder Aff., Ex. C, R. Vol. II, pp. 129-32; Snyder Aff., Ex. F,

R. Vol. II, pp. 139-43.) Best of the Best then sold the vehicles without having paid for them and
without providing the certificates of title to the consumers in violation of Idaho law, showing a
tendency to deceive both the businesses and the consumers.
Therefore, the district court correctly found that Western Surety's payments on the Dealers
and Brasher's claims were made in good faith. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 18, 1. 24 - p. 21, 1. 16.) There is no
dispute that the consumers who purchased cars from Dealers and Brasher' s never received their titles
from Best of the Best. (Snyder Aff.,Ex. F, R. Vol. II, p. 139; Snyder Aff.,Ex. M, R. Vol. II,pp. 15557.) There is no dispute that there was a violation of LC. §§ 49-502(1), 49-1609A, and 49-1613.
There is no dispute that resolution of title claims is important, as it is crucial to consumers that they
obtain title to a newly purchased vehicle. (Snyder Aff., <J[ 6.f, R. Vol. II, p. 117; Evett Aff., Marler
Dep., p. 15, l. 9 - p. 16, l. 25, R. Vol. I, p. 77-78; Evett Aff., Marler Dep., p. 44, 1. 1 - p. 45, 1. 5, R.
Vol. I, p. 85.) There is no dispute that ITD has long sent "claims" that are not based onjudgments
to Western Surety, and that it expects the claims to be responded to. (Snyder Aff., <[ 6.b, R. Vol. II,
p. 116; Evett Aff., Marler Dep., p. 38, 11. 17-23, R. Vol. I, p. 83.)
Last, there is no dispute that payment of the Dealers and Brasher' s claims resulted in titles
being provided to the consumers who did not have them. (Snyder Aff., Ex. K, R. Vol. II,pp.152-53;
Snyder Aff., Ex. N, R. Vol. II, pp. 158-59.) No further complaints have been received by Dealers,
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Brasher' s, or the consumers, therefore, payment by Western Surety resolved the claims. These factors
all support the district court's finding that Western Surety paid the claims in good faith.
Accordingly, Western Surety did not pay as a volunteer under I.C. § 41-1839(3). Because the
sole legal theory on which Hestead based his argument (the volunteer doctrine) fails, the district
court's decision was in error.
2.

Idaho Code § 49-1610 does not create a requirement that a surety issue payment
to a claimant only upon presentation of a judgment.

The statutory language ofl. C. § 49-1610 relates to a claimant's right ofaction against a motor
vehicle dealer. It does not provide that a surety may only issue payment to a claimant upon
presentation of a judgment. Only I.C. § 41-1839(3) provides a standard for the payment of bond
claims.
Idaho Code§ 49-1610 states, in pertinent part:
Right of action for loss by fraud-Process-(1) If any person shall
suffer any loss or damage by reason of any fraud practiced on him or
fraudulent representation made to him by a licensed dealer... or shall
suffer any loss or damage by reason of the violation by the dealer or
salesman of any of the provisions of this chapter, or chapter 5, title 49,
Idaho Code, or section 49-1418, Idaho Code, or chapter 6, title 48,
Idaho Code, or any applicable rule or regulation of the board, or
federal odometer law or regulation, that person shall have a right of
action against the dealer and his salesman.
(2) .... [A]ny person who is or may be injured by a violation of a
provision of this chapter... may bring an action for damages and
equitable relief, including injunctive relief.

(4) Whenever any person is awarded a final judgment in a court of
competent jurisdiction in the state of Idaho for any loss or damage by
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reason of the violation by such dealer or salesman of any of the
provisions of this chapter, chapter 5, title 49, section 49-1418, or
chapter 6, title 48, Idaho Code, or any rule or regulation of the
department m connection with the purchase of a vehicle, or federal
motor vehicle safety standards, or in connection with the purchase of
a vehicle if the loss or damage is a result of odometer tampering, or
odometer fraud, the judgment creditor may file a verified claim with
the corporate surety who has provided the dealer's surety bond, or
with the chairman of the dealer advisory board where the dealer has
deposited with the director a cash bond or certificate of deposit.
(a)

The claim shall be filed no sooner than thirty (30) days
and no later than one (1) year after the judgment has
become final.

(b)

The claim shall:
1.
Be accompanied by a certified copy of the
judgment;
2.
State the amount of the claim if different from
the judgment amount; and
3.
State that demand has been made upon the
dealer for payment of the judgment, and the
dealer has failed to pay the judgment in full
within thirty (30) days.

J.C.§ 49-1610(1)-(4) (emphasis added).
The plam, usual, and ordmary meaning of the statutory language demonstrates that the intent
of the legislature was to give persons who suffer loss or damage a right of action again~t a dealer that
has violated various provisions of the Idaho Code, or committed fraud. While J.C. § 49-1610
establishes a right of action for an individual to bring a case to court and provides a process for the
individual to present a judgment for payment, the statute does not govern a surety's payment of the
claim. Idaho Code§ 41-1839(3) does.
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To the extent the statute contains a procedural requirement for submission of a judgment, the
only purpose of that requirement is to protect a dealer who wishes to dispute a claim. By definition,
the procedural steps are of no benefit to a claimant who, to obtain a judgment must file suit, usually
with the representation of counsel, at some expense. Hestead cannot argue that he is entitled to any
arguable protections of J.C. § 49-1610, which can only apply, by definition, to principals who want to
dispute a claim.
The general purpose of the motor vehicle dealer bond requirement further supports the
interpretation that I.C. § 49-1610 does not require a judgment be submitted to a surety prior to payment
in all circumstances, i.e., when the parties agree a claim is valid and should be paid. The Idaho Court
of Appeals in Bryant Motors, Inc. v. American States Insurance Cos., held that "bonds are construed
in the light of the statute creating the obligation secured and of the purposes for which the bond is
required, as expressed in the statute." 118Idaho 796,798, 800P.2d 683,685 (Ct. App. 1990); see also

Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon Corp., 125 Idaho 409,417, 871 P.2d 826, 834 (1994) ("[I]t is a
principle of Idaho law that the obligation of a surety on a bond required by statute is determined by the
obligations and purposes set forth in the statute.").
In Bryant Motors, the Court of Appeals held that the purpose for which a bond is required
under J.C.§ 49-1608 13 is "to indemnify any person injured by the dealer's fraud in conducting his
13

The motor vehicle dealer bond requirement is set forth in J.C.§ 49-1608. The applicable portions of the
statute provide as follows:

License bond. ( 1) Before any dealer's license shall be issued by the department
to any applicant, the applicant shall procure and file with the department good
and sufficient bond in the amount shown, conditioned that the applicant shall not
practice any fraud, make any fraudulent representation or violate any of the
provisions of this chapter, rules of the department, or the provisions of chapter 5,
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business of selling vehicles.'' 118 Idaho at 799,800 P.2d at 686 (emphasis in original). The Court
then indicated that "in enacting I.C. § 49-1610(1), the legislature provided a remedy to any person
suffering any loss as a result of any fraudulent representation made by [sic] dealer." Id. (emphasis
in original).
When a claimant provides Western Surety with undisputed evidence that he or she suffered
such a loss due to the principal' s fraud, Western Surety runs the risk of incurring a fee award if it does
not pay the amount justly due. See US. Fid & Guar. Co. v. Clover Creek Cattle Co., 92 Idaho 889,
452 P .2d 993 ( 1969). In Clover Creek, Clover Creek Cattle Company made written demand upon the
principal and the surety on June 22, 1965, for payment arising from non-payment of two drafts and
non-payment of the purchase price of cattle. 92 Idaho at 893, 452 P .2d at 997. The surety subsequently
denied the claim on December 15, 1965. Id. The trial court granted judgment in favor of Clover Creek
on July 5, 1967, and awarded interest from the date of the claim denial. Id. at 894,452 P.2d at 998.
The Court agreed with the district court's determination that legal liability attached to the
surety at the time that the principal failed to pay for the cattle purchased by him. Id. at 900, 452 P.2d
at 1004. The principal' sonly defense to liability was that the bond did not constitute an independent
title 49, section 49-1418, or chapter 6, title 48, ldaho Code, or federal motor
vehicle safety standards, or odometer fraud in the conduct of the business for
which he is licensed.
(a) All dealers, including wholesale ... twenty thousand dollars
($20,000).
(2) The bond required in this section may be continuous in form and the total
aggregate liability on the bond shall be limited to the payment of the amounts set
forth in this section. The bond shall be in the following fonn:
(a) A corporate surety bond, by a surety licensed to do business in this
state....

LC.§ 49-1608(1)-(2).
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promise by him to guarantee payment for all cattle purchased, specifically where he was acting as an
agent for a purchaser. Id. at 897,452 P.2d at 1001. The Court found that this was not a valid defense
and the principal was therefore liable. Id.
Clover Creek then acted upon that legal obligation by demanding payment from the surety,
which the surety rejected. Id. at 900, 452 P .2d at 1004. Therefore, the Court found that the trial court
did not err in awarding interest to Clover Creek from the date of the surety's denfal of the claim. Id.
The Court then also awarded attorney fees to Clover Creek, upholding the district court's holding,
pursuant to LC.§ 41-1839, that "the actions of the surety brought it squarely within the terms of the
statute in that it refused to pay the amount justly due Clover Creek for more than sixty days after
receiving written notification of the claim. Nor did the surety tender the full amount justly due Clover
Creek before the commencement of the action." Id. at 901,452 P.2d at 1005.
ln accordance with Clover Creek, had Western Surety refused to tender the amount justly due
to Dealers and Brasher's on behalf of the consumers after receiving written notification of the claims,
Western Surety would have exposed itself to paying attorney fees in subsequent litigation. Legal
liability attached at the time that Best of the Best violated the prohibitions of LC. §§ 49-1608(1) and
49-1610(1 ). Dealers and Brasher' s presented undisputed evidence of the violations. Therefore, under

Clover Creek, Western Surety had to determine the amount justly due after receiving written
notification ofthe claims under I.C. § 41-1839(3).
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3.

Western Surety substantiaUy complied with J.C.§§ 49-1610 and 41-1839 when it
paid the valid, undisputed claims submitted by Dealers and Brasher's.

Ata minimum, Western Surety has substantially complied with LC.§§ 49-1610 and4l-1839.
'"Substantial compliance' means compliance in respect to the essential matters necessary to insure
every reasonable objective of the statute." Dunegan v. City of Council Grove, Kansas Water Dep't,
77 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1205 (D. Kan. 1999); see also 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction§ 57:26 (7th
ed.). Western.Surety has achieved the objectives ofl.C. §§ 49-1610 and41-1839 by paying claims for
undisputed violations ofl.C. § 49-1610 and sparing claimants and Western Surety's principal the high
costs of litigation.
Accordingly, should this Court hold that Western Surety did not technically comply with LC.
§ 49-1610 by paying claims not based on judgments, it still substantially complied with the statute by
paying the Dealers and Brasher's claims.

4.

Hestead's "volunteer" theory fails under I.C. § 41-1839(3), and his interpretation
of I.C. §§ 49-1610 and 41-1839 would lead to absurd and unreasonably harsh
results.
a.

Parties would be forced to incur the high costs of litigation even where all
parties agree the claim should be paid and a principal does not have a valid
defense.

It would lead to absurd and unreasonably harsh results to interpret LC.§§ 49-1610and41-1839

to require claimants to file suit to obtain judgments when all parties agree that valid claims should be
paid. See In re Daniel W., 145 Idaho 677, 680, 183 P.3d 765, 768 (2008) ("Constructions that would
lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored.") Where a dealer offers no defense or
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even requests that the surety pay, 14 it would be unreasonably harsh to all parties to require a claimant
to hire an attorney to prove what the parties already know.
While LC.§ 49-1610 provides a process by which a claimant may bring a claim, it does not
preclude a surety from paying a valid, undisputed claim when a claimant has not filed suit against the
principal. That would undercut LC. § 41-1839, which requires a surety to determine the portion or
amount of a claim that is justly due to a claimant, and provides that good faith payment of such amount
does not prejudice the right of the surety to indemnification.
To find that I.C. § 49-1610 requires a surety to force claimants with valid, undisputed claims
to obtain judgments would lead to absurd and unreasonably harsh results by requiring all parties to
unnecessarily incur litigation costs, undercutting the purpose of LC.§ 41-1839(3) and this Court's
precedent.
b.

Claimants would be forced to wait until the statute of limitations ran or all
claims were reduced to judgments before a surety could issue payment.

Western Surety has a common law duty to pay claims it has notice of pro rata. 15 Therefore,
under Plaintiffs interpretation of the statute, it would have to wait until all of the claims it had notice
of were reduced to judgments, or the statute of limitations ran, before it could distribute the bond
proceeds. Since there is no specific statute of limitations provided for claims under J.C.§ 49-1610,

14

Hestead's proposed rule would require a surety to refuse to pay even when the principal requested
payment under the bond.
15

In Walton v. Eu, the California Court of Appeals cited to a string of cases from Oregon, California,
Oklahoma, and Louisiana in support of the proposition that "when claims are made to the surety in excess of the
amount of the penalty the total amount of the penalty should be prorated among the persons so damaged." 191 Cal.
Rptr. 779, 782 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
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LC.§ 5-224 controls: "An action for relief not herein before provided for must be commenced within
four (4) years after the cause of action shall have accrued." Therefore, under Hestead's proposed
interpretation ofLC. § 49-1610, even when no one disputes the validity of claims, claimants may have
to wait in excess of four years before being paid under a surety bond if judgments are required.
This result could not be more contrary to the public policy goals ofI.C. §§ 49-1610 and 411839.
c.

Western Surety is entitled to indemnification under I.C. § 41-1839(3) for the
payments made to Dealers and Brasher' sand it would, therefore, lead to absurd
results to find that Western Surety could be liable for payment under the bond
twice.

Idaho Code§ 41-1839(3) provides that when a surety determines what amount of a claim is
justly due and tenders payment, that payment is not deemed a "volunteer payment" and thus does not
prejudice any right of the surety to indemnification so long as the determination and payment by the
surety was made in good faith. As held in Clover Creek, discussed above, when a principal does not
have a valid defense to a claim, legal liability attaches, and the surety becomes liable at that time. 92
Idaho 889,452 P.2d 993 (1969).
Hestead's primary argument below was that Western Surety paid the Dealers and Brasher's
claims as a "volunteer" and therefore remained liable to other claimants who procedurally complied
with I.C. § 49-1610. (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., R. Vol. I, p. 24; Snyder Aff., Ex. V, R.
Vol. II, p. 177.) He based this argument on a 1930 case from New York. See Frank v. Hartford
Accident & Jndem. Co., 239N.Y.S. 397 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1930). Hestead argues that Frank means that
Western Surety may be held liable beyond the bond amount because it paid as a "volunteer." (Mem.
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in Supp. of Mot. for Swnm. J., R. Vol. I, p. 24; Snyder Aff., Ex. V., R. Vol. II, p. 177.) A 1930 case
from New York does not define when a surety is deemed a volunteer in Idaho. 16 Idaho Code
§ 41-1839(3) does, as it states that a surety that pays a claim in "good faith" does not do so as a
volunteer.
There is no dispute that Western Surety paid the Dealers and Brasher's claims in good faith.

See Part B.1.b., supra. Hestead never asserted below they were not paid in good faith. The district
court found that Western Surety paid the claims in good faith. (See Tr., Vol. I, p. 18, I. 24-p. 21, I. 16.)
Hestead has not challenged the district court's finding on appeal.
Accordingly, there is no dispute that Western Surety did not pay the Dealers and Brasher's
claims as a volunteer. This destroys the legal theory on which Hestead based his argument below.

5.

Hestead cannot coUater:,dly attack Western Surety's proper payments to Dealers
and Brasher's under J.C. § 49-1610.

Idaho Code § 49-1610 does not give Hestead a right of action against Western Surety for
Western Surety's alleged violation of the process provisions of that statute in paying claims to other

16

[n addition, Frank addressed the liability ofan insurer, not a surety. A much more recent case out of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York addressed the "volunteer doctrine" in the context
of a payment by a surety under New York law, and stated:
The "volunteer doctrine" provides that an insurer who pays a claim it is not obligated to pay
is a "volunteer" as to that claim, and may notobtain subrogation of the claim from another
party .... The doctrine may apply to cases in which a surety seeks indemnification in the
absence of an express indemnity agreement, or where the indemnity agreement does not
include a settlements clause, but in such cases, the surety can recover upon a showing that
it "acted pursuant to a reasonable detennination that it was liable," not proof that it was
actually liable.

Gen. Accident Ins. Co. ofAmerica v. Merritt-Meridian Constr. Corp., 975 F. Supp. 511, 517 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(quotingFid. & Cas. Co. v. Finch, 159 N.Y.S. 2d 391,396 (N.Y. App. Div. 3 1957). The one New York case even
remotely similar to this case is actually similar to LC. § 41-1839(3 ). Frank does not apply to this case.
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consumers. Hestead's collateral attack on Western Surety's payment of the Dealers and Brasher's
claims is indispensable to his case, 17 yet, the statute provides no basis for his claim.
Hestead made his claim after Western Surety paid the other claims and exhausted the bond.
Hestead is now collaterally attacking Western Surety's handling of the prior claims. The statute does
not provide that a subsequent claimant may make the surety pay again if the procedures of subsection
(4) are not followed.
It does not permit a third party claimant to try to benefit when a surety has made it easier for
previous claimants to recover. Additionally, the procedural requirements ofI.C. § 49-1610 can only
be intended to protect the principal on the bond. Any conceivable right of action arising out of a
violation of the requirements of subsection (4) would belong to the dealer, although even then the
question of whether payment was appropriate would be answered under LC.§ 41-1839(3), notI.C. §
49-1610.

17

In his Complaint, Hestead alleged the following:
No other person, entity, or organization has obtained a Judgment against Best of the
Best Auto Sales Inc. and made a claim upon the bond referenced herein.
No other person, entity, or organization has complied with the statutory
requirements in Idaho Code 49-1610 for presentation of claims upon the bond
referenced herein.
Plaintiffs [sic] are therefore entitled to reimbursement from the Defendant for the
amount of$20,000.00, plus lawful interest that accrues, and attorneys fees pursuant
to Idaho Code 41-1839 or other applicable statute.

(Comp!., R. Vol. I, p. 7.)
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c.

The District Court Erred in Holding Western Surety Liable In Excess of the Aggregate
Liability of $20,000.00 Set by J.C. § 49-1608 Because It Paid the Claims in Good Faith
and Its Liability Was Not Varied by Contract or Statute.
Western Surety exhausted the $20,000.00 bond through its payments of the valid, undisputed

claims presented by Dealers and Brasher's and it cannot now be held liable above and beyond that
statutory penal amount. "[O]ne of the most fundamental rules of suretyship [is that] except in limited
circumstances, a surety's liability cannot extend beyond the penal sum announced in the bond."

Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Ground Improvement Techniques, Inc., 532 F.3d 1063, 1072 (10th Cir.
2008).
The following statement provides the legal standard for bond exhaustion:
Ordinarily, a surety on a bond is not liable beyond the penalty named
in such bond. This limitation may, however, be varied by the contract,
by bad faith on the part of the surety, or by statute.

If the amount of the penalty named in a bond is insufficient to satisfy
all claims, such amount must be apportioned. A surety is not, however,
a trustee for all claimants and is not under a duty to ascertain the
identities of all present and possible future claimants in order to insure
that a pro rata distribution is made. Thus, if a claimant seeks to eajoy
the proceeds of a bond established for his or her benefit, it is incumbent
upon the claimant to affirmatively assert his or her rights to that bond.
If a claimant does not do so, and a surety, in good faith and without
knowledge ofcompeting claimants, exhausts its liability under the bond
by paying only those claimants that are known to it, its liability is
extinguished.

72 C.J.S. Principal and Surety§ 83 (emphasis added).
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Hestead did not demonstrate at the district court level that Wes tern Surety committed bad faith,
by paying the Dealers and Brasher's claimants, 18 or that Western Surety's liability was varied by
contract or statute. To the contrary, the district court found Western Surety paid the claims in good
faith.
Idaho Code§ 49-1608 provides that a "bond required in this section may be continuous in form
and the total aggregate liability on the bond shall be limited to the payment of the amounts set forth
in this section." LC. § 49-1608(2). The amount set by the statute for dealers such as Best of the Best
is $20,000.00. I.C. § 49-1608(l)(a). Idaho Code§ 49-1610 does not provide that a violation of its
procedures subjects a surety to have to pay in excess of the bond amount. Therefore, the motor vehicle
dealer bond statutes do not provide for any additional liability under a bond.
The bond issued to Best of the Best by Western Surety also stated: "The aggregate liability of
the Surety shall be limited to the amount of this bond, regardless of the number of years this bond shall
remain in effect and regardless of the number and amount of claims made thereon." (Snyder Aff., Ex.
A, R. Vol. II, p. 123.) The amount of the bond was set at $20,000.00. ( Id.)

Therefore, the bond

agreement did not provide for any variation in Western Surety's liability under the bond. Based upon
both the statute and the contract, the aggregate liability was $20,000.00, with no provisions for liability
beyond the penal sum.
Finally, Western Surety paid the undisputed and valid Dealers and Brasher' s claims under I.C.
§§ 49-1608(1) and 49-1610(1) before it even received Hestead's claim. At the time it made the

18

Hestead never asserted such claim in his complaint against Western Surety. See Comp]., R. Vol. I, pp. 4-

8.
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payments, Western Surety did not have knowledge of competing claimants. As a matter of law,
Western Surety acted in good faith in paying the Dealers and Brasher's claims. See PartB.l.b., supra.
Therefore, Western Surety cannot be liable above the $20,000.00 bond, and the district court erred in
granting Hestead summary judgment.

IV. REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Western Surety requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41 and LC.

§ 41-1839(4). "Idaho Code§§ 41-1839 and 12-123 are the exclusive remedies for obtaining attorney
fees in disputes arising out ofinsurance policies." Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho
437,447,235 P.3d 387, 397 (2010). Idaho Code§ 41-1839(4) provides that fees may be awarded
when a court finds "from the facts presented to it that a case was brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." LC.§ 41-1839(4).
Hestead' s claim was brought and pursued without foundation in Jaw because the plain language
of LC.§ 41-1839(3) allows a surety to pay claims submitted to it without requiring that the claimant
first obtain a judgment. Hestead never disputed that the claims paid before his were substantively
valid. Accordingly, Western Surety is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
V. CONCLUSION
Western Surety respectfully requests that this Court find that the district court erred in granting
Hestead summary judgment as a matter oflaw. Western Surety acted in accordance with LC.§§ 491610 and 41-1839 when it exhausted the $20,000.00 motor vehicle dealer bond through payments on
valid, undisputed claims. Therefore, Western Surety requests that this Court vacate the district court's
judgment, and remand to the district court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Western
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Surety because Western Surety paid the Dealers and Brasher's claims in good faith. Western Surety
also requests attorney fees and costs on appeal.
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